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INTRODUCTION
On September 28, 2016, a politically divided United States
Senate overrode President Barack Obama’s veto for the first
and only time in a particularly decisive vote: 97–1.1 The joint
effort was the culmination of a ten-year effort to pass the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA).2 JASTA created a new terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act by allowing United States citizens to bring suit
against foreign states that have aided and abetted acts of terrorism.3 Despite President Obama’s strong condemnation of
the legislation in his veto address,4 Republican Senator John
Cornyn praised JASTA as a “strong bill with a narrow focus”
that fixed a loophole in the United States’ approach to foreign
sovereign immunity.5 From across the aisle, Democratic Senator Chuck Schumer also expressed his optimism about the bill
by emphasizing that the Legislature’s focus in passing JASTA
1
Mohammed Cherkaoui, The U.S. JASTA: An Asset or a Liability for America
Abroad?, AL JAZEERA (Dec. 28, 2016, 13:38 Mecca), http://studies.aljazeera.net/
en/reports/2016/12/jasta-asset-liability-america-161228101858709.html
[http://perma.cc/SX65-R3J9]. Senate Minority Whip Harry Reid was the sole
dissenter, while Senator Bernie Sanders and Senator Tim Kaine missed the vote
to campaign with Hillary Clinton. Id. The House vote to override President
Obama’s veto was almost as decisive: 348–77. Juliet Eilperin & Karoun Demirjian, Congress Thwarts Obama on Bill Allowing 9/11 Lawsuits Against Saudi
Arabia, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
congress-thwarts-obama-on-bill-allowing-911-lawsuits-against-saudi-arabia/
2016/09/28/a93e31ba-859b-11e6-ac72-a29979381495_story.html?utm_term=
.aeb669500efe [http://perma.cc/5NAD-X7BB].
2
Cherkaoui, supra note 1.
3
Ingrid Wuerth, Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act: Initial Analysis,
LAWFARE: FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT (Sept. 29, 2016, 2:19 PM), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/justice-against-sponsors-terrorism-act-initial-analysis
[http://perma.cc/6NWD-QA6F] (suggesting that JASTA may simply codify a
power courts had sometimes previously exercised under federal common law).
4
Presidential Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Justice
Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, 2016 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 628 (Sept. 23,
2016). President Obama’s spokesperson Josh Earnest further criticized the bill
by calling it “the single most embarrassing thing that the United States Senate
has done, possibly, since 1983.” Jordan Fabian, White House Lashes out at
‘Embarrassing’ Senate Veto Override, HILL (Sept. 28, 2016, 1:45 PM), http://the
hill.com/homenews/administration/298290-white-house-lashes-out-at-embar
rassing-senate-veto [https://perma.cc/VPB5-3NJP].
5
Cherkaoui, supra note 1.
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was families and justice rather than diplomatic
considerations.6
Reactions across the globe were neither as positive nor as
hopeful. The Dutch Parliament condemned the new legislation
as a “‘gross unwarranted breach of Dutch sovereignty,’ which
could result in ‘astronomical damages.’”7 French Member of
Parliament Pierre Lellouche cautioned that JASTA would
“cause a legal revolution in international law with major political consequences.”8 Unsurprisingly, the Saudi Arabian government, which was the main target of the updated legislation,
also responded negatively. The Saudi Arabian government
threatened to sell all of their holdings in U.S. government assets, which was estimated at the time to be $750 billion.9
This Note explores the issues with the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act that JASTA attempts to address, the likelihood
of JASTA’s success, and whether or not JASTA is a desirable
solution. Though the relatively recent nature of this addition
renders the long-term impact difficult to assess, an examination of foreign sovereign immunity doctrine’s origins, evolution,
and purpose provides sufficient information to make predictions about potential problems with JASTA. Part I briefly
tracks the history of foreign sovereign immunity in the United
States and the transition from an absolutist approach to a
restricted approach. Part I also discusses the codification of
the restricted approach to foreign sovereign immunity and its
potential shortcomings. Part II discusses the original terrorism
exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, its
origins, early uses, shortcomings, and amendments. Then,
Part III explores the political background that gave rise to
JASTA and raises concerns about the implications of such
sweeping legislation.

6

Id.
Id. (quoting Elura Nanos, Bill Allowing Terror Victims to Sue Saudi Arabia
Creates Serious Potentional Problems, LAW & CRIME (Sep. 21, 2016, 10:59 AM),
https://lawandcrime.com/important/bill-allowing-terror-victims-to-sue-saudiarabia-creates-serious-potential-problems/ [https://perma.cc/DRY4-A6VV]).
8
Id. (quoting Nanos, supra note 7).
9
Mark Mazzetti, Saudi Arabia Warns of Economic Fallout if Congress Passes
9/11 Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/16/
world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-warns-ofeconomic-fallout-if-congress-passes-911-bill.html [http://perma.cc/7H6P-6E6W]. Some estimates of Saudi assets
range as low as $117 billion. Daniel Pipes, Cruel Hoax: The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, NAT’L REV. (June 2, 2016, 6:33 PM), http://www.national
review.com/corner/436003/justice-against-sponsors-terrorism-act-cruel-hoax
[http://perma.cc/7NYD-GAA8].
7
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I
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY’S ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION
A. Absolutism
The concept of foreign sovereign immunity has a long history both across the world and in the United States.10 Starting
with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, international law considered nation-states to be the world’s principal actors and presumed these states to be equal and uninvolved with each
other’s internal affairs.11 These presumptions gave rise to an
absolutist formulation of foreign sovereign immunity that required states to refrain from exercising any legal authority over
one another.12 This absolute version of foreign sovereign immunity dominated cross-border litigation for centuries.13
In the United States, The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon
opinion articulated four principles of foreign sovereign immunity and was later interpreted as extending absolute immunity
to foreign sovereigns.14 First, Chief Justice Marshall explained
that a sovereign state’s jurisdiction “derives from the perfect
equality and independence” of each state and that this jurisdiction is exclusive, absolute, and subject only to its own limitations.15 Second, the Chief Justice recognized that “common
interest” prevents sovereigns from exerting extraterritorial jurisdiction.16 This recognition would reinforce the basis for arguing that comity and reciprocity required absolute foreign
sovereign immunity.17 Third, the The Schooner Exchange opinion established that exceptions to immunity must be consen10
See Richard T. Micco, Putting the Terrorist-Sponsoring State in the Dock:
Recent Changes in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Individual’s Recourse Against Foreign Powers, 14 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 109, 119 n.80 (2000)
(first quoting PLATO, LAWS, BOOK III 683e (Thomas L. Pangle ed., Univ. of Chicago
Press); then quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)).
11
See Derek Croxton, The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of
Sovereignty, 21 INT’L HIST. REV. 569, 569–70 (1999) (acknowledging that many
scholars believe the Peace of Westphalia established the principle of sovereignty).
12
See Micco, supra note 10, at 119–20.
13
See Robert B. von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 33, 34 (1978) (“[A] theory of foreign sovereign immunity, which was rejected by the Immunities Act, is the ‘absolute doctrine’ that
extends the immunity of a foreign state to all suits against it.”).
14
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); see
Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 268–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see also
Micco, supra note 10, at 121 (“State immunity operates as a restraint on the
exercise of jurisdiction of one sovereign’s legal system over another state.”).
15
Tachiona, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 268 (citing The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) at 136).
16
Id. (quoting The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 137).
17
See Id.
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sual, either impliedly or expressly, and listed common law
examples of implied consent.18 And lastly, Chief Justice Marshall discussed immunity for foreign sovereigns and their rulers, ultimately suggesting that immunity is “unitary and
coextensive.”19
Using these principles, American courts recognized “three
objects of foreign sovereign immunity: diplomatic, head of
state, and state.”20 In 1926, the Supreme Court expanded the
holding from The Schooner Exchange (which only applied to
states’ private property) to all state entities regardless of public
or private ownership in Berizzi Brothers Co. v. Steamship
Pesaro.21 This holding represented the apex of absolutist interpretations of foreign sovereign immunity.
The rise of state-owned commercial enterprises and monopolies forced both the judiciary and the Executive Branch to
reevaluate the wisdom of absolute foreign immunity.22 Instead
of presumptively granting foreign sovereigns immunity from
civil litigation, courts began relying on certifications of immunity from the State Department, effectively acknowledging the
political nature of the determination.23 Slowly, American
courts internalized an obligation to “accept and follow the executive determination” of immunity for foreign sovereigns.24
This shift toward a more restrictive approach to state sovereign immunity was also clearly documented in the “Tate Letter” from Jack B. Tate, the Acting Legal Advisor at the State
Department.25 On May 19, 1952, Tate wrote to Attorney General Philip B. Pearlman to explain the State Department’s decision to transition from an absolutist approach to a restrictive
18

Id. at 269.
Id.; see also id. at 305 (stating that “the head-of-state doctrine as a residual
branch of common law sovereign immunity addresses the personal immunity of
the ruler”).
20
Micco, supra note 10, at 120.
21
See Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926) (“The decision in The Exchange therefore cannot be taken as excluding merchant ships held
and used by a government from the principles there announced. On the contrary,
if such ships come within those principles, they must be held to have the same
immunity as war ships . . . .”); see also Todd Connors, The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: Using Separation of Powers Analysis to Guide Judicial DecisionMaking, 26 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 203, 209 (1994) (“[T]he [Berizzi] court extended
the privilege of sovereign immunity to all foreign state entities, without distinction
between their public and private acts.”).
22
See Micco, supra note 10, at 123.
23
See Connors, supra note 21, at 210.
24
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 36 (1945).
25
Jack B. Tate, Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments, 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter The Tate
Letter]; see Micco, supra note 10, at 123.
19
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approach to foreign sovereign immunity. The Tate Letter cited
the United States’ submission to suit for merchant vessels and
“the widespread and increasing practice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial activities.”26 Though the Tate
Letter set out the Executive’s reasons for the shift, this new
approach failed to provide specific guidelines and criteria for
courts to follow when deciding to exercise jurisdiction.27 Furthermore, the State Department was not required to comment
on each foreign sovereign immunity case that entered the
courts, occasionally leaving courts without a standard for assessment.28 Consequently, this restrictive but uncodified approach that dominated courts’ approach to foreign sovereign
immunity between 1952 and 1976, allowed foreign sovereigns
to inappropriately influence the State Department29 and obligated the courts to abide by the Executive’s decisions even
when they were inconsistent with doctrine or precedent.30
B. Restricted Immunity and the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976
Recognizing the problems posed by the Tate Letter’s approach, the United States Congress proposed and passed the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), effectively
codifying the United States’ adherence to a restrictive approach
to foreign sovereign immunity.31 As he signed the Act, President Gerald Ford expressed his hopes that the FSIA would
“make it easier for our citizens and foreign governments to turn
to the courts to resolve ordinary legal disputes” and hailed the
FSIA as “carr[ying] forward a modern and enlightened trend in
international law.”32 Though President Ford did not explicitly
state it as one of the FSIA’s purposes, the Act was also aimed at
both freeing the State Department from making case-by-case
determinations in foreign sovereign immunity claims and at
26
Chem. Nat. Res., Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 215 A.2d 864, 884 (Pa.
1966) (quoting The Tate Letter).
27
See von Mehren, supra note 13, at 41.
28
See Connors, supra note 21, at 211.
29
See Micco, supra note 10, at 124–25.
30
See id. at 125; Connors, supra note 21, at 211–12.
31
Jeewon Kim, Making State Sponsors of Terrorism Pay: A Separation of
Powers Discourse Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. 513, 514 (2014).
32
von Mehren, supra note 13, at 33 (quoting Presidential Statement on Signing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 3 PUB. PAPERS 937 (Oct. 22,
1976)).

R
R
R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-5\CRN504.txt

unknown

Seq: 7

27-AUG-18

2018] JASTA’S ADDITION TO TERRORISM EXCEPTION

15:26

1299

removing undue political influences from the certification
process.33
Four key features characterize the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. First, the Act codified the restricted immunity approach to foreign sovereignty.34 Second, the FSIA
entrenched the idea of equality between the foreign and domestic sovereign.35 Third, the codification of restricted immunity
shifted the burden of determining sovereign immunity from the
State Department to the Judiciary,36 replacing the Judicial
duty with deference to the Executive.37 Finally, the FSIA restricted jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns to in personam jurisdiction by eliminating in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction.38
Notably, the Act also explicitly carved out exceptions to foreign
sovereign immunity such as consent and commercial activities.39 In 1988, arbitrated settlements were added as an exception and, as will be discussed later, state sponsors of terrorism
were added as an exception in the 1990s.40
Though the FSIA did clarify the Judiciary’s role in foreign
sovereign immunity determinations, the Act was by no means a
panacea for the difficulties posed by litigating against foreign
sovereigns and may have created issues of its own. Perhaps
the most immediately problematic issue was the lack of guidance in the FSIA about what constitutes “commercial activity.”41 Section 1603(d) of the Act requires that courts use “the
nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act,
33
34

See Micco, supra note 10, at 125.
See von Mehren, supra note 13, at 45; see also Connors, supra note 21, at

R

213.
35
See von Mehren, supra note 13, at 45. The FSIA allows foreign sovereigns
to forego a trial by jury in the same way U.S. sovereigns may also be excepted.
Foreign sovereigns are given the same number of days to answer and reply as
domestic sovereigns. The Act also limits default judgments to the same circumstances in which default judgments would be entered against a domestic sovereign. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly for claimants using terrorism
exception jurisdiction, the FSIA largely prevents attachment of property prior to
judgment in the same way it does for domestic sovereigns. See id. at 45–46.
36
See Kim, supra note 31, at 514.
37
See von Mehren, supra note 13, at 45.
38
Id. As von Mehren notes, it is rare for a statute to prioritize in personam
jurisdiction over in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction, but, in the case of foreign
sovereign immunity, it makes sense. Von Mehren offers two justifications for this
limitation: (1) U.S. courts should not be obligated to try cases simply because a
foreign sovereign owns property located in the U.S. and (2) attachment of property
before judgment would pose “an irritant in American foreign relations.” Id. at
46–47.
39
Micco, supra note 10, at 126.
40
Id. at 126, 128–29.
41
See Connors, supra note 21, at 205.
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rather than by reference to its purpose,” for determining
whether an activity is commercial.42 This definition and the
FSIA’s legislative history are meant to give wide discretion to
the courts in defining commercial activity.43 However, this has
proven particularly difficult because the FSIA mandated a departure from precedent.44 Similarly, § 1605(a)(2) denies immunity to cases “based upon” commercial activities and cases
“based upon” an act “in connection with a commercial activity.”45 These poorly defined standards have created disagreements between the lower courts and led to discrepancies in
applications of the FSIA.46
Even following the codification of restricted foreign sovereign immunity, the issue of whether the Judiciary or the Executive was constitutionally mandated to review these decisions
remained at large. Some commentators have concluded that if
the issue ever reached the Supreme Court, it would be unlikely
that the Court would hold that the Judiciary is constitutionally
mandated to defer to the Executive in immunity cases.47 Other
commentators have suggested the polar opposite.48 To further
confuse the issue of constitutional mandates, in Verlinden B.V.
v. Central Bank of Nigeria, the Supreme Court held that “foreign sovereign immunity is a matter of grace and comity on the
part of the United States, and not a restriction imposed by the
Constitution.”49 This uncertainty about the role of the Judiciary, the Executive, and the requirements imposed by the Constitution have eviscerated predictability under the FSIA, and
have shrouded in mystery courts’ decisions regarding immunity. However, it is also worth noting that all states recognize
42

28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2012).
See von Mehren, supra note 13, at 53.
44
See id. Prior to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, courts used the
standard discussed in Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), to determine whether an
activity was commercial. This standard set out five instances in which the court
would rule in favor of sovereign immunity: “(1) internal administrative acts, . . . (2)
legislative acts, . . . (3) acts concerning the armed forces[,] (4) acts concerning
diplomatic activity[, and] (5) public loans.” Id. at 360. The Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act’s requirement that courts examine the nature and not the purpose
of a sovereign’s activity departed from this standard by eliminating the “public vs.
political” distinction in Victory Transport and furthermore removed purpose from
the traditional assessment, leaving only “nature” as a guiding influence.
45
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012).
46
GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 279 (5th ed. 2011).
47
See Connors, supra note 21, at 208–09.
48
See Martin S. Flaherty, Restoring Separation of Powers in Foreign Affairs, 2
J. INT’L COMP. L. 22–23 (2016).
49
Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
43

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-5\CRN504.txt

unknown

Seq: 9

27-AUG-18

2018] JASTA’S ADDITION TO TERRORISM EXCEPTION

15:26

1301

some form of foreign sovereign immunity.50 The United States’
decision to enact the FSIA was based in part on a belief that it
was adhering to international law, suggesting that comity,
though not constitutionally mandated, is an important consideration in these cases.51
As will be discussed below in relation to cases arising
under the terrorism exception to the FSIA, enforcement of judgments against foreign sovereigns has proven particularly difficult.52 The primary means of enforcement of judgments
against foreign sovereigns is the attachment of “the property
[that] is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the
claim is based.”53 However, this mechanism relies on foreign
sovereigns having property within the United States that claimants may attach and that these foreign sovereigns accept the
validity of the proceedings against them.54 Because it is rarely
the case that a foreign sovereign meets both criteria for enforcement, the FSIA is largely toothless in terms of enforcement.55
Additionally, the presumption of immunity for foreign sovereigns has also created controversy over the pleading standards required to bring a case against a foreign sovereign and
what standard courts should use to determine whether a taking was “in violation of international law.”56 A heightened
pleading standard for FSIA claims and a strenuous test for
finding a violation of international law may make claims under
FSIA even more difficult to sustain.

50
See Jasper Finke, Sovereign Immunity: Rule, Comity or Something Else?, 21
EUR. J. INT’L. L. 853, 871, 874 (2010).
51
See id.
52
See Micco, supra note 10, at 135. The FSIA’s lack of enforcement mechanism pushed Micco to declare judgments won under the FSIA as a mere “paper
award for the trouble of bringing, presenting and proving a case.” Id.
53
28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (2012).
54
Micco, supra note 10, at 135.
55
Jack Goldsmith, President Obama Should Veto JASTA, LAWFARE (Sept. 14,
2016, 8:45 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/president-obama-should-vetojasta [https://perma.cc/6MZK-NEKD].
56
Bolivarian Republic of Venez. v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 137
S. Ct. 1312, 1323 (2017) (holding that claimants must show more than a nonfrivolous argument that property was taken in violation of international law to
bring a claim within the scope of the FSIA). This case also requires that courts
resolve factual disputes about a defense of foreign sovereign immunity “as near to
the outset of the case as is reasonably possible.” Id. at 1317.
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II
CARVING OUT AN EXCEPTION FOR TERRORISM
A. Origins and Motivating Factors
For over twenty years, the FSIA was “the sole vehicle for
redressing international human rights violations.”57 Despite
being the only mechanism for addressing these matters, suing
a foreign sovereign under the FSIA was by no means easy.58
Plaintiffs would have to either hope a foreign sovereign consented to suit or, alternatively, prove that the alleged human
rights violation, such as an act of terrorism, had been both in
the foreign sovereign’s interest and committed on U.S. soil by
an agent of the foreign government.59 The narrow number of
cases that could meet the criteria of location and actor were
still unlikely to succeed because courts consistently held that
terrorist activities were not commercial.60 The 1979 capture of
the United States Embassy in Tehran by Hezbollah gave rise to
Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, in which former hostages
sought damages from the Iranian government for their abduction.61 This case was originally dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over Iran.62 Similarly, Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, a suit based on the Lockerbie bombing in
December 1988, was also initially dismissed due to foreign sovereign immunity.63 Additionally, § 1604’s presumption of immunity,64 combined with the Executive’s attempts to restrict
suits against foreign sovereigns, made the FSIA an unsatisfactory mechanism to address human rights violations.65
Frustration with the narrow opportunity to sue foreign sovereigns was exacerbated by several events in the late 1980s
and early 1990s and ultimately led to an amendment that added a “terrorism exception” to foreign sovereign immunity.66
The 1993 New York World Trade Center bombing,67 the 1995
57

Kim, supra note 31, at 515.
Micco, supra note 10, at 111.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 111–12.
61
See Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d. 164 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
62
See id. at 168–69.
63
See Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 886 F. Supp. 306,
315 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
64
28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012).
65
See Kim, supra note 31, at 519–20.
66
See Micco, supra note 10, at 109.
67
See Jesse Greenspan, Remembering the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing,
HIST., (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.history.com/news/remembering-the-1993world-trade-center-bombing [https://perma.cc/R8VL-5YQ7].
58
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Tokyo subway attack,68 and the 1995 bombing of a federal
office in Oklahoma City69 preyed on fears of Middle Eastern
terrorism affecting the United States domestically and intensified the perceived need to create a means of bringing suits
against foreign sovereigns.70 Perhaps the most direct line from
an act of terrorism to a change in jurisdiction over foreign
sovereigns can be drawn between the 1995 death of Alisa
Flatow and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) and Flatow Amendment of 1996.71 Section 221 of the
AEDPA created a “terrorism exception” to foreign sovereign immunity that enabled suits against certain foreign sovereigns.72
The AEDPA allowed courts to strip states that had been designated a state sponsor of terrorism by the State Department of
foreign sovereign immunity.73 The Flatow Amendment to the
Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism, which followed just five months after the AEDPA, allowed plaintiffs to
seek punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages in
cases of state-sponsored terrorism.74 With these two pieces of
legislation, the Flatow family successfully sued Iran for their
daughter’s death and won a judgment of $20 million in compensatory damages and $225 million in punitive damages.75
B. Early Days of Litigation under the Terrorism Exception
Litigation under these provisions began immediately. By
2004, U.S. courts had awarded plaintiffs over $4.4 billion in
68
See Nicholas D. Kristof, Poison Gas Fills Tokyo Subway; Six Die and Hundreds Are Hurt, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/
20/world/poison-gas-fills-tokyo-subway-six-die-and-hundreds-are-hurt.html
[https://perma.cc/5P8D-DTJG].
69
See Penelope Poulou, Oklahoma City Bombing Documentary Examines
Growth of American Extremism, VOA NEWS (Mar. 7, 2017, 11:32 AM), http://www.
voanews.com/a/oklahoma-city-bombing-homegrown-extremism-terrorism/
3753687.html [https://perma.cc/G7ZA-6QMC].
70
See Micco, supra note 10, at 110 n.5.
71
See id. at 109, 112; see also Joseph Keller, The Flatow Amendment and
State-Sponsored Terrorism, 28 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 1029, 1031 (2005). Alisa Flatow
was a twenty-year-old Jewish American student at Brandeis University studying
abroad in Israel. On April 9, 1995, Alisa was aboard a bus with sixty Israeli
soldiers on its way to a seacoast village when a bomb exploded, taking the lives of
seven soldiers and Alisa. It was later discovered that the Shaqaqi faction of the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, an organization sponsored by the Iranian government,
was responsible for this attack. Id.
72
See Micco, supra note 10, at 112, 130.
73
See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Human
Rights Violations: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 71,
78 (1998).
74
Keller, supra note 71, at 1031.
75
See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 34 (D.D.C. 1998).
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damages against state sponsors of terror.76 Cases like Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba and Cicippio II illustrated U.S. plaintiffs’
newfound ability to win judgments with tremendous compensatory and punitive damages.77 In many of these cases, the
foreign sovereigns facing suit chose not to make an appearance
in U.S. courts, and the courts consequently entered large default judgments in their absence.78 Rein v. Socialist People’s
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, another case concerning the Lockerbie bombing, clarified the terrorism exception’s standard for
personal jurisdiction.79 The Second Circuit explained in Rein
that suits brought under the FSIA’s terrorist exception do not
require minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction,
but instead need only successful service of process.80
These cases also began to expose the gaps in coverage for
victims of terrorism and state sponsors of human rights violations. They betrayed an inequality of citizenship inherent in
the terrorism exception. Despite having suffered the same
harms, non-U.S. citizens were barred from recovering against
foreign sovereigns notwithstanding their connections to the
United States through property ownership and permanent residency.81 Because the 1996 amendments to the FSIA restricted
both the eligible claimants and defendants in the terrorism
exception, the provision’s efficacy in addressing terrorism and
compensating victims is necessarily limited.82 Through these
76
Kelly A. Atherton, Compensating Victims under the “Terrorism-Exception” of
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A State-Sponsored Victim’s Compensation
Fund, 12 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 158, 158–59 (2004).
77
See Micco, supra note 10, at 112. In Cicippio II, the District Court for the
District of Columbia granted $65 million in compensatory damages. See Cicippio
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62, 70 (D.D.C. 1998). And though the
court did not grant punitive damages, the claimants in Cicippio II were eventually
able to collect $73.2 million under § 2002 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (VTVPA). See DAVID M. ACKERMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL31258, SUITS AGAINST TERRORIST STATES 22 (2002). In Alejandre, the Southern
District of Florida granted nearly $50 million in compensatory damages and
$137.7 million in punitive damages. See Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F.
Supp. 1239, 1253 (1997). Under § 2002, the claimants were able to collect $96.7
million from liquidated Cuban assets. Cf. Kim, supra note 31, at 520 (noting that
the VTVPA led the U.S. government to liquidate approximately half of Cuba’s
$193.5 million in frozen assets to compensate the claimants).
78
See Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Note, Resolving Outstanding Judgments
Under the Terrorism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 496, 505–06 (2002).
79
See Rein v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748, 753
(2d Cir. 1998).
80
See id. at 759.
81
See Micco, supra note 10, at 116.
82
As discussed above, the terrorism exception limits the defendants subject
to liability to those designated by the U.S. State Department as state sponsors of
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early cases, courts articulated the contours of the terrorism
exception by holding that the Flatow Amendment created
neither respondeat superior for foreign states,83 nor an independent cause of action for claimants.84
Perhaps more troubling than the articulation of the terrorism exception’s boundaries was the issue of enforcement and
executive action to thwart the collection of judgments. The
Clinton administration refused to release foreign sovereigns’
assets to facilitate the collection of damages and claimed that
these assets were protected by international agreements and
were a vital part of United States foreign relations.85 The inability to attach property rendered the judgments nothing more
than nominal awards, frustrated the purpose of the terrorism
exception, and prompted the changes discussed below.
C. Beginning of Change
Shortly after creating a terrorism exception to foreign sovereign immunity, Congress began amending it to address the
issues raised by early litigation. In response to the Clinton
administration’s refusal to release assets, Congress amended
§ 1610 of the FSIA to allow attachment “at the request of any
party in whose favor a judgment has been issued with respect
to a claim for which the foreign state is not immune” through

terrorism. For a current list of these nations designated as such, see State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151
.htm [http://perma.cc/NTR3-Q6PG]. This list has been subject to little change
with only eight countries ever being on the list: Iran (added in 1984 by President
Ronald Reagan), Sudan (added in 1993 by President Bill Clinton), Syria (added in
1979 by President Jimmy Carter), North Korea (added in 1988 by President Ronald Reagan, removed from the list in 2008 by President George W. Bush, and
reinstated in 2017 by President Donald Trump), Cuba (added in 1982 by President Ronald Reagan and removed in 2015 by President Barack Obama), Iraq
(added in 1979 by President Jimmy Carter and removed in 2004 by President
George W. Bush), Libya (added in 1979 by President Jimmy Carter and removed
in 2006 by President George W. Bush), and South Yemen (added in 1979 by
President Jimmy Carter and removed in 1990 after merging with the Yemen Arab
Republic to form Yemen). See Country Reports on Terrorism, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/ [https://perma.cc/VQN4-KDAD]; Overview
of State-Sponsored Terrorism, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Apr. 29, 2004), https://www
.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2003/31644.htm [https://perma.cc/4UR9-TNZN].
83
See Hurst v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 474 F. Supp. 2d
19, 26 (D.D.C. 2007) (stating “[i]f Congress had intended to create respondeat
superior liability for foreign states under the Flatow Amendment, it would have
said so”).
84
See Keller, supra note 74, at 1031–32.
85
See Kim, supra note 31, at 519–20.
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the Treasury Department Appropriations Act of 1999.86 However, this Act also contained a section discussing waiver that
allowed the President to “waive the requirements of this section
in the interest of national security.”87 President Clinton took
immediate advantage of this provision by signing the Act into
law and then immediately invoking the waiver for all foreign
assets, effectively turning the waiver clause into a line item
veto.88
Forced to reorganize yet again, Congress next passed the
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (VTVPA) in
2000.89 Section 2002 of this Act enables plaintiffs who have
won suits against Iran or Cuba to recover compensatory, but
not punitive, damages in exchange for an agreement not to
attach certain property.90 This provision implicitly denies relief
to claimants who sued Iraq and Libya and denies claimants
suing Iran and Cuba a means of recovering what is likely to be
the larger portion of their damages.91 Ultimately, the half measure proposed by the VTVPA enabled claimants in one case
against Cuba and ten cases against Iran to move forward with
collection on their judgments.92 Treasury Secretary Paul
O’Neill liquidated frozen Cuban assets in February 2001,93 allowing the claimants in Alejandre to collect $96.7 million in
damages.94
However, in spite of this legislation and its stated purpose,
the Clinton and Bush administrations still refused to liquidate
Iran’s assets, asserting that this would “seriously compromise
important national security and foreign policy interests” and
86
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 117(B)(2)(A), 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f)(2)(A) (2012)).
87
Id. § 117(d).
88
See Presidential Statement on Signing the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, 3 PUB. PAPERS 2352 (Oct. 28, 2000).
89
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) (codified as 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (2012)).
90
See Kim, supra note 31, at 520.
91
Cf. id. at 521 (discussing how some plaintiffs who had been awarded judgments did not receive payment).
92
Id. at 520.
93
See Mark C. Medish, In the Name of the Patriot Act: That’s Ours, WASH. POST
(Oct. 19, 2003), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2003/10/
19/in-the-name-of-the-patriot-act-thats-ours/a03f9531-4493-4b50-9bff-e96bea
de6352/?utm_term=.f39ad07357df [http://perma.cc/Y8EU-NBCX].
94
See Andrew Lyubarsky, Clearing the Road to Havana: Settling Legally
Questionable Terrorism Judgments to Ensure Normalization of Relations Between
the United States and Cuba, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 459, 468 (2016).
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unfairly discriminate between claimants.95 Instead, the U.S.
Treasury paid over $350 million to partially satisfy the judgments in nine of ten cases against Iran.96 Because this permitted the alleged state sponsors of terrorism to escape the
financial ramifications of an adverse judgment against them,
this use of taxpayers’ money to satisfy judgments jeopardizes
any deterrent effect that the terrorism exception offers and
raises issues of fairness. Furthermore, designating the Executive as responsible for enforcing the judiciary’s judgments creates serious separation of powers concerns, which will be
discussed below.
For today’s plaintiffs, attachment of foreign sovereign assets remains difficult.97 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
extends foreign sovereign immunity to immunity from attachment,98 meaning that plaintiffs seeking to attach property as a
means of enforcement must demonstrate that the property
sought to be attached falls into an exception listed by the Act.99
Because prejudgment attachment of foreign sovereign assets is
largely unheard of,100 plaintiffs suing a foreign sovereign must
usually seek post-judgment attachment of a foreign sovereign’s
assets.101 However, post-judgment attachment may only proceed once a plaintiff has won a favorable judgment, which in
itself constitutes a serious obstacle. Sections 1610(a) and (b)
discuss attachment of both a foreign sovereign’s properties and
properties owned by a foreign sovereign’s agencies and instrumentalities.102 Though the provisions for attaching property
owned by an agency or instrumentality of a foreign sovereign
95
Sean K. Mangan, Note, Compensation for “Certain” Victims of Terrorism
Under Section 2002 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of
2000: Individual Payments at an Institutional Cost, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 1037, 1052
(2002).
96
See Kim, supra note 31, at 520–21.
97
See Kenneth Reisenfeld, Mark Cymrot & Joshua Robbins, Suits Against
Foreign Sovereigns: Mixed Bag for Energy Cos., LAW360 (Jan. 17, 2017, 4:54 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/881735 [http://perma.cc/564H-LMW7].
98
See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 § 1610(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1602
(1976).
99
See id. § 1610(a)–(g).
100
Cf. id. § 1610(d) (describing requirements for pre-judgment attachments).
Section 1610(d)(2) allows for attachment where a state has explicitly waived its
immunity or “purpose of the attachment is to secure satisfaction of a judgment
that has been or may ultimately be entered against the foreign state, and not to
obtain jurisdiction.” For a discussion of prejudgment attachment under the FSIA,
see Craig J. Hanson, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: The Use of Pre-Judgment Attachment to Ensure Satisfaction of Anticipated Judgments, 2 NW. J. INT’L L.
& BUS. 517 (1980).
101
See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 1610.
102
See id. § 1610(a)–(b).
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are broader,103 plaintiffs still face a limited number of exceptions that they may use to enforce judgments against a foreign
sovereign. However, § 1610(g) of the FSIA specifically allows for
attachment in cases arising under the original terrorism exception and many more exceptions to sovereign immunity from
attachment.104 Regardless of the type of property sought to be
attached, the FSIA also requires that “a reasonable period of
time has elapsed following the entry of judgment” before attachment is ordered.105
Given these significant obstacles, Congress has continued
to attempt changes to the FSIA’s enforcement provisions. In
another attempt to bolster enforcement of awards against foreign sovereigns under the terrorism exception and cure the
FSIA’s defects, Congress passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance
Act of 2002 (TRIA).106 This Act attempts to avoid the “line item
veto” through waiver that rendered the Treasury Department
Appropriations Act ineffective, by requiring that the President
make asset-by-asset determinations about the national security interest at stake.107 TRIA also diminishes the Executive’s
power to protect foreign sovereigns by protecting only certain
assets as defined by the Vienna Convention.108 Together these
changes provided for certain judgments against Iran to be enforced and collected. Congress has extended TRIA through
2020, and though it does work to provide remedies to some
FSIA claimants, these solutions make arbitrary distinctions between similarly situated claimants and further causes tension
between the three branches of government.109 It is also worth
noting that, despite Congressional efforts, as of May 2016, Iran
still owed $53 billion in unpaid U.S. court judgments with no
concrete means of enforcement on the horizon.110
103
Unlike § 1610(a), § 1610(b), which applies to agencies and instrumentalities, does not require that the property sought to be attached be used in a commercial activity that is the basis of the claim. See id. § 1610(b)(2).
104
See id. § 1610(g).
105
Id. § 1610(c). The Supreme Court has yet to rule on what constitutes a
“reasonable period of time.”
106
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322
(2002) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1610).
107
See Kim, supra note 31, at 522.
108
See id.
109
See id.
110
Orde Kittrie, Iran Still Owes $53 Billion in Unpaid U.S. Court Judgments to
American Victims of Iranian Terrorism, FOUND. FOR DEF. OF DEMOCRACIES (May 9,
2016), http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/orde-kittrie-after-supremecourt-decision-iran-still-owes-53-billion-in-unpaid-us-cour/ [https://perma.cc/
HDW6-HM2Z].
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III
PASSING JASTA
A.

Changes to Foreign Sovereign Immunity under JASTA

JASTA’s stated objectives seem to address the loopholes
created by the original terrorism exception to foreign sovereign
immunity and its amendments. The version of JASTA that
ultimately became law in 2016, included a congressional finding that “terrorism is a serious and deadly problem that threatens the vital interests of the United States” and that Congress
must “recognize the substantive causes of action for aiding and
abetting conspiracy liability under Chapter 113B of title 18 [of
the] United States Code.”111 However, more than simply recognizing these causes of action, JASTA exempts
[p]ersons, entities or countries that knowingly or recklessly
contribute material support or resources, directly or indirectly, to persons or organizations that pose a significant risk
of committing acts of terrorism that threaten the security of
nationals of the United States or the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, necessarily direct their conduct at the United States, and should
reasonably anticipate being brought to court in the United
States to answer for such activities

from foreign sovereign immunity protection.112 JASTA touts
this expansion of the terrorism exception as providing claimants with “the broadest possible basis, consistent with the
Constitution of the United States, to seek relief against persons, entities, and foreign countries . . . that engage in terrorist
activities against the United States.”113
JASTA achieves this goal by creating a new exception to the
jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state. The previous terrorism exception found in 28 U.S.C. § 1605A required that a state
be designated a state sponsor of terror in order to be stripped of
foreign sovereign immunity.114 The new exception to jurisdictional immunity created by JASTA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605B, includes no such limitation.115 In addition to removing the
requirement of designation as a state sponsor of terrorism,
§ 4(a) of JASTA also expanded the opportunities to seek relief
for international terrorism by extending 18 U.S.C. § 2333 to
111
Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-222,
§§ 2(a)(1), 2(a)(4), 130 Stat. 852 [hereinafter JASTA].
112
JASTA § 2(a)(6).
113
JASTA § 2(b).
114
28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)–(II).
115
28 U.S.C. § 1605B.
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include “any person who aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person
who committed such an act of international terrorism.”116 Together, § 1605B and the amended version of § 2333 create a
new cause of action available to claimants seeking relief for
international terrorism.117
Though JASTA creates an expansive cause of action to sue
foreign states allegedly involved in terrorism, there are some
mechanisms within the bill that curb this wide applicability.
Section 3(a) of JASTA explicitly excludes omissions, tortious
acts, and merely negligent acts as potential bases for § 1605B
exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.118 Section 3(b) of
JASTA preserves 28 U.S.C. §1605(g)(1)(A)’s provision allowing
courts to stay “any request, demand, or order for discovery on
the United States that the Attorney General certifies would
significantly interfere with a criminal investigation or prosecution, or a national security operation.”119 Section 3(c) limits
defendants in aiding and abetting suits to only officials acting
outside their official capacity, representing a significant limitation on the threat JASTA poses to foreign sovereign immunity.120 JASTA also includes an intervention provision that
may severely restrict the number of cases that could continue
using these newly formed causes of action. Section 5(b) of
JASTA gives courts the discretion to grant a stay in a case
against a foreign sovereign, at the request of the Attorney General, if the Secretary of State certifies that the United States is
currently engaged in good faith negotiations with the defendant
state.121 Following the initial stay of 180 days, the court is
obligated to extend the stay if the Secretary of State recertifies
good faith negotiations with the foreign state.122 JASTA does
not place an upper limit on the number of stays a court is
obligated to grant following certification and is silent on any
standard of review for recertification.

116
JASTA § 4(a). This section also contains a limiting factor that the terrorist
organization that the defendant has allegedly aided or abetted be considered a
Foreign Terrorist Organization under § 219 of the Immigration and Nationalist
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2012).
117
See Wuerth, supra note 3.
118
JASTA § 3(a).
119
28 U.S.C. § 1605(g)(1)(A).
120
JASTA § 3(c).
121
JASTA § 5(b).
122
Id.
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B. Concerns with JASTA’s Approach to Foreign Sovereign
Immunity
JASTA renewed discussions surrounding foreign sovereign
immunity and the roles of the judiciary and the Executive in
adjudicating and enforcing such claims. Though some of these
critiques and concerns are not unique to the terrorism exception and apply more generally to foreign sovereignty as a whole,
the amendments introduced by JASTA highlighted and magnified these concerns.
1. Comity and Reciprocity
When the terrorist exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act was first codified, the Department of Justice expressed concern that other countries, specifically the Middle
Eastern states that bore the brunt of this legislation’s consequences, would interpret the AEDPA as extraterritorial pressure to conform to Western legal ideologies.123 This unwelcome
pressure, the Department of Justice posited, could lead other
foreign sovereigns to enact mirror-image legislation that would
render the United States liable for its acts abroad in the name
of stopping terrorism.124 To make matters worse, the Department of Justice argued, foreign legislatures drafting and passing these reciprocal acts would not be obligated to limit the acts
in the same way that the FSIA’s terrorism exception is limited.125 It is also worth noting that, with the exception of Canada, the terrorism exception is a uniquely American
mechanism for providing relief to victims of terrorism.126
Furthermore, this unilateral implementation of American
norms and definitions of terrorism and appropriate remedies
under the terrorism exception not only seems to violate the
norm of international reciprocity, but the norm of comity as
well. The Department of Justice described the terrorism exception as it was first legislated, as an act of American “political
and cultural hegemony” that is fundamentally at odds with the
concept that other nations are inherent equals with exclusive
and absolute jurisdiction over their internal affairs.127
123

See Micco, supra note 10, at 116.
See id.
125
See id. at 116–17.
126
See Lincoln Caylor, Foreign States Now Liable in Canada for Terrorism and
Improper Commercial Conduct, ICC FRAUDNET, https://icc-ccs.org/talkfraud/foreign-states-now-liable-in-canada-for-terrorism-and-improper-commercial-conduct-lincoln [https://perma.cc/AKW5-8TSN] (last visited May 7, 2017).
127
Micco, supra note 10, at 117.
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One aspect of American litigation that is particularly troublesome in the context of international comity and reciprocity is
the potential for large punitive damages. This discomfort with
punitive damages is especially acute in terrorism litigation. As
previously mentioned, the Flatow Amendment allowed claimants using the terrorism exception to foreign sovereign immunity to seek both punitive and compensatory damages.128 The
Flatow family’s case against Iran and other subsequent litigation illustrated that American courts were unlikely to shy away
from awarding sizable damages to victims of international terrorism, despite the lack of acceptance of punitive damages
abroad.129 Punitive damages in general have gained significant
attention and critique from European legal scholars, and these
criticisms are likely to be even more pronounced in cases like
Flatow because of the size of the awards and the controversial
nature of the cause of action. By awarding such large punitive
damages, the United States and its significant global military
presence may risk equally large, reciprocal decisions against it
from foreign courts.
Though reciprocity and comity were at the forefront of the
original terrorism exception, JASTA’s passage amplified these
concerns. As President Obama highlighted in his veto address,
the true danger of JASTA lies in its potential to “upset longstanding international principles regarding sovereign immunity, putting in place rules that, if applied globally, could have
serious implications for U.S. national interests.”130 Because
the United States has a uniquely large global presence, it heavily relies on foreign sovereign immunity to limit the number of
lawsuits against the U.S. government.131 Keeping this reliance
128

See id. at 109.
Expert testimony in Flatow counseled that “a factor of three times its
annual expenditure for terrorist activities would be the minimum amount which
would affect the conduct of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and that a factor of up to
ten times its annual expenditure for terrorism must be considered to constitute a
serious deterrent to future terrorist activities aimed at United States nationals.”
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 34 (D.D.C. 1998). The D.C.
District Court also examined several broad factors before awarding $225 million
in punitive damages. These factors included: “(1) the nature of the act itself, and
the extent to which any civilized society would find that act repugnant; (2) the
circumstances of its planning; (3) Defendants’ economic status with regard to the
ability of Defendants to pay; and (4) the basis upon which a Court might determine the amount of an award reasonably sufficient to deter like conduct in the
future, both by the Defendants and others.” Id. at 33.
130
Presidential Message to the Senate Returning without Approval the Justice
Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, 2016 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 628 (Sept. 23,
2016).
131
See Cherkaoui, supra note 1.
129
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in mind, some analysts argue that creating a standard that
would allow for more cases against foreign sovereigns is a
“huge mistake”132 that “opens up a Pandora’s box” in terms of
future lawsuits.133 Adel al-Jubeir, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, warned that “[t]he United States is, by eroding [the sovereign immunity] principle, opening the door for other countries
to take similar steps and then before you know it international
order becomes governed by the law of the jungle.”134
Even if other countries simply copied and codified the language from JASTA and did not take any liberties to further
expand this exception to foreign sovereign immunity, government entities, persons, entities, organizations and affiliated
groups, individuals, and the United States as a country would
be vulnerable to suit.135 This immediate reciprocity is not farfetched. Following the Alvarez-Machain case,136 Iran responded by drafting a bill that enabled Iran to “to arrest anywhere Americans who take action against Iranian citizens or
property anywhere in the world and bring them to Iran for
trial.”137
In a more recent example, a group called the “Arab Project”
in Iraq requested that the Iraqi parliament file a lawsuit against
the United States over the U.S.’s involvement in Iraq in 2003,
illustrating the desire to not only litigate against the United
States, but also to hold the nation responsible for its military
engagements.138
132
Id. (quoting John Kruzel, Legal Experts Say Allowing 9/11 Families to Sue
Saudi Arabia Has Consequences, ABC NEWS (Sep. 28, 2016, 7:43 PM), http://
abcnews.go.com/Politics/legal-experts-law-allowing-911-families-sue-saudia/
story?id=42432568 [https://perma.cc/C4VS-6SDP]).
133
Michel Chossudovsky, Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA):
U.S. Citizens Can Now Sue Foreign Governments, GLOBAL RES. (Oct. 13, 2016),
http://www.globalresearch.ca/justice-against-sponsors-of-terrorism-act-jastau-s-citizens-can-now-sue-foreign-governments/5550781 [https://perma.cc/
M8EL-BWDJ].
134
Saudi Arabia Lobbies to Amend JASTA Law Which Allows 9/11 Victims to
Sue the Gulf State, RT (Dec. 19, 2016 7:25) (alteration in original), https://www.rt
.com/usa/370708-saudi-jasta-terrorism-change/ [https://perma.cc/52W3Z73C].
135
See id.
136
See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 96 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 1996),
amended and superseded by, 107 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 1996).
137
Micco, supra note 10, at 144 (quoting Mark S. Zaid, Military Might Versus
Sovereign Right: The Kidnapping of Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain and the Resulting Fallout, 19 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 829, 850 (1997)).
138
See Joshua Claybourn, Suing the Saudis Would Be a Mistake, AM. SPECTATOR (Nov. 4, 2016, 3:11 AM), https://spectator.org/suing-the-saudis-would-be-amistake/ [https://perma.cc/7VMJ-VSU3].
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Recent events in Turkey present a potential future issue
arising out of reciprocity in foreign sovereign immunity. Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan believes the United
States harbored a rebellious cleric that helped precipitate Turkey’s recent attempted coup.139 Under principles of reciprocity, President Erdogan and the Turkish legislature would be
justified in introducing legislation similar to JASTA that would
hold the United States liable for the damages caused by the
attempted coup.140 Similar to the potential Turkish suit
against the United States, if foreign countries followed the
norm of reciprocity, JASTA becomes particularly dangerous because it “opens up government agencies to court-ordered
discovery.”141
On the other hand, proponents of this bill like Senator
Cornyn defend JASTA by emphasizing that “JASTA is not a
departure from our long-standing approach to sovereign immunity; it just fixes the loophole.”142 Despite these protests, it
is clear that the Saudi Arabian government did not view JASTA
as consistent with international law, but instead referred to the
act as an “erosion of sovereign immunity” that would “have a
negative impact on all nations, including the United States.”143
Former State Department Legal Adviser John B. Bellinger III
stated that by departing from these norms of presumed foreign
sovereignty, Congress was “playing with fire” and that “[w]hen
we ourselves begin to chip away at sovereign immunity . . . it
does encourage other countries to chip away at sovereign immunity.”144 “[B]ecause the U.S. government takes rules very
seriously,” amended legislation that allows for suits against the
U.S. government would likely be strictly followed, creating a
situation where JASTA would have a larger impact on the U.S.
sovereign than the Saudi Arabian government.145

139

See id.
See id.
141
Eilperin & Demirjian, supra note 1.
142
See Cherkaoui, supra note 1 (quoting John Cornyn & Terry Strada, Opinion, No Remorse for Passing the Needed Jasta Act, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 9, 2016,
1:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/no-remorse-for-passing-the-neededjasta-act-1476034833 [https://perma.cc/QX67-NXE3]).
143
Mark Mazzetti, Claims of Saudi Role in 9/11 Appear Headed for Manhattan
Court, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/30/us/
saudi-arabia-9-11-legal-battle.html [https://perma.cc/SB38-5TQN].
144
Eilperin & Demirjian, supra note 1 (alteration in original).
145
Id.
140
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2. Separation of Powers
Perhaps one of the most pressing concerns surrounding
the terrorism exception and foreign sovereign immunity generally (and JASTA specifically) is the disruption of the Constitution’s separation of powers between the three branches of the
federal government. Separation of powers and the proper balance between the branches is usually discussed in reference to
three specific issues: (1) when there is a “constitutional commitment of an issue to the political branches for resolution;” (2)
when there is no manageable judicial standard available to
address the issue; and (3) when the need for a unified position
from the federal government is imperative.146 In the case of
JASTA and the proper scope of foreign sovereign immunity,
only the third issue is in serious jeopardy.
a. Formalism: Article I and Article II Powers
The formalist argument, that the Constitution textually
removes foreign sovereign immunity from the Judiciary’s power
or Congress’s ability to legislate, is relatively weak. The Constitution grants affirmative foreign affairs powers to both the Legislature and the Executive, but by no means provides an
exhaustive list of capabilities or responsibilities.147 This “invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign
policy” has sparked intense debates about each branch’s
power.148
Article I of the Constitution allocates the powers to “regulate Commerce with foreign nations,” “declare war,” “raise and
support Armies,” “provide and maintain a Navy,” and “make
rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
forces” to Congress.149 The Senate is also involved in ratifying
treaties and consenting to diplomatic appointments.150 Additionally, the Constitution grants Congress the power to make
any laws that are “necessary and proper” to execute its other
powers, which may arguably include legislation like JASTA.151
The Constitution in turn designates the President as the
Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy, and allocates to
146

Connors, supra note 21, at 222.
Jonathan Masters, U.S. Foreign Policy Powers: Congress and the President,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 2, 2017), http://www.cfr.org/united-states/us-for
eign-policy-powers-congress-president/p38889 [https://perma.cc/2PQA-7M9A].
148
Id. (quoting another source).
149
U.S. CONST. art. I § 8.
150
See id.
151
Id.
147
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the Executive the power to appoint ambassadors and enter into
treaties in Article II.152 This exclusive power to appoint and
receive ambassadors has been historically implied to include
the authority to recognize foreign governments and conduct
diplomatic correspondence with other countries generally.153
However, because neither Article I nor Article II explicitly
delegates exclusive power over foreign policy or foreign sovereign immunity to either branch, a formalist argument that
JASTA’s allocation of power between the branches violates the
Constitution is not compelling. Furthermore, the history of
foreign sovereign immunity in the United States also weighs
against a formalist rejection of JASTA. Starting with the codification of restricted foreign sovereign immunity in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, legislative intervention in this
realm of foreign policy has been relatively common and even
viewed as a desirable form of cooperation between the
branches.154 The numerous subsequent amendments to the
legislation and judicial decisions further suggest that this is an
area of law in which Congress and the courts have been and
will likely remain involved.
b. Functionalism: The Judiciary’s Role under JASTA
Therefore, any opposition to JASTA from a separation of
powers point of view would be better supported by a functionalist approach. Some critics of the terrorism exception and
JASTA’s expansion of jurisdiction argue that these laws “assign[ ] a task to U.S. federal courts for which they are illsuited.”155 Jack Goldsmith, former General Counsel of the Department of Defense, described JASTA’s allocation of control
over foreign sovereign immunity to United States federal courts
as “an awkward place to ascertain Saudi responsibility for 9/
11,” especially for the President who will have to address any
potential diplomatic fall out.156 This critique of the federal
courts as “awkward” in the context of foreign sovereign immunity seems to be affirmed by the courts’ own behavior. United
States federal courts have developed a number of standards
such as ripeness, mootness, standing, and technical definitions of “case or controversy” to avoid ruling on certain
152

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
See Masters, supra note 147.
154
See Danica Curavic, Compensating Victims of Terrorism or Frustrating Cultural Diplomacy? The Unintended Consequences of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s Terrorism Provisions, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 381, 393 (2010).
155
See Cherkaoui, supra note 1 (citing Nanos, supra note 7).
156
Id. (citing Nanos, supra note 7).
153
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cases.157 Though there are benefits to careful consideration of
jurisdiction, U.S. federal courts seem to employ these standards with particular frequency in cases involving foreign affairs.158 This reluctance and discomfort on the courts’ part
seems to reflect the undesirability of JASTA’s allocation of
power between the branches of government.
The role of federal courts in deciding foreign sovereign immunity under JASTA piques fears that the United States will no
longer be able to present a cohesive foreign policy program, but
will instead be left with a “a patchwork of different courts
reaching different conclusions about individual foreign governments.”159 This concern about the proper role of the judiciary
did not go unnoticed, even by those who voted in favor of
JASTA. Despite having voted in favor of JASTA, Senator Bob
Corker admitted that the new bill effectively “export[ed] . . .
foreign policy to trial lawyers.”160 Though this concern about
the overinvolvement of the Judiciary in foreign sovereign immunity cases is implicated by the original terrorism exception,
JASTA increases the frequency and likelihood of this troubling
scenario arising.161 Proponents of JASTA and an empowered
judiciary may also argue that this new legislation merely codifies a common law grant of authorities courts have been making use of for years and therefore presents no new separation of
powers concerns.162 It may also be tempting to place significant power in the judiciary because “only courts and bureaucrats” (in contrast to the Legislature and the Executive) “have
longer time horizons.”163 However, U.S. federal courts are
staffed by generalists with specific jurisdiction, not experts
157
Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 284,
285 (1987).
158
Id.
159
Claybourn, supra note 138. As Yishai Schwartz notes in his review of
Nitsana Darshan-Leitner and Samuel Katz’s recent book, “[e]ach lawsuit that
seeks to move the war on terror into the civil courts deals an additional blow to the
possibility of a coherent foreign policy.” Yishai Schwartz, Following the Money,
LAWFARE (Jan. 18, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/followingmoney [https://perma.cc/D7A6-5VND].
160
Enter the Lawyers, ECONOMIST (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.economist
.com/news/united-states/21707931-presidents-veto-ringingly-overturned-con
gress-enter-lawyers [https://perma.cc/F4KH-H5TL].
161
See James E. Berger & Charlene C. Sun, JASTA Amendments to FSIA
Become Law, JDSUPRA (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/
jasta-amendments-to-fsia-become-law-81257/ [https://perma.cc/C9X8-PK7Y]
(referring to the increase in the litigation as “[t]he most likely consequence of
JASTA’s adoption in the immediate term”).
162
See Wuerth, supra note 3.
163
Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2345 (2006).
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well-versed in international relations, terrorism, or national
security.164
Similarly, proponents of a large judiciary role in foreign
sovereign immunity may argue courts are “more constrained
by legal factors and less likely to base their decisions on political factors” when they have adequate doctrinal guidance.165
However, empirical studies supporting the independence and
stability of the judicial system have not been able to definitively
declare the judiciary’s decision-making process apolitical.166
Furthermore, JASTA’s creation of a new cause of action,
§ 1605B, and the emotionally charged nature of claims brought
by victims of the 9/11 attacks are likely to vitiate any doctrinal
rigidity courts generally enjoy.167 Likewise, in contrast to other
areas of foreign sovereign immunity like the commercial activity exception, concepts like “aiding and abetting” and “material
support” in relation to international terrorism are even more
poorly defined and doctrinally undeveloped.
c. Functionalism: Legislative Intervention in Foreign
Sovereign Immunity through JASTA
JASTA’s expansion of foreign sovereign immunity also represents a significant use of congressional power to influence
foreign affairs. Congress’s historical involvement in foreign
sovereign immunity doctrine suggests that this role, if not constitutionally contemplated, is at least widely accepted. However, despite the supporting precedents for congressional
involvement in foreign sovereign immunity, the legislative process surrounding JASTA specifically illustrates why this addition to the terrorism exception is particularly dangerous and
demonstrative of Congress’s functional difficulties addressing
these issues.
First, in stark contrast to the judiciary, Congress and its
members have remarkably short time horizons. Congressional
patterns of productivity suggest that a looming election has a
164

See id.
Adam S. Chilton & Christopher A. Whytock, Foreign Sovereign Immunity
and Comparative Institutional Competence, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 459 (2015).
166
Id. This empirical study found that for decisions concerning the commercial activity exception to foreign sovereign immunity, judges were more legally
constrained and political factors were particularly unimportant in these decisions. The authors credit the well-developed legal doctrine surrounding the commercial activity exception as an explanation for this constraint. The authors also
found that courts were more likely to grant immunity to “wealthy, democratic
allies” than other nations, and when the United States government was a plaintiff.
Id. at 465; see id. at 420.
167
See id. at 477–78.
165
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significant impact on which legislation becomes law.168
Though congresspeople tend to introduce fewer bills during
election years, the number of bills that pass Congress actually
increases, suggesting a pressure to appear productive, competent, and active in the lead-up to an election.169 The pressures
of an election year may push Congress to pass legislation it is
either afraid to deny or is not fully informed about. In the case
of JASTA, Congress was “not at its bravest weeks before a
general election”170 and feared being “perceived as voting
against 9/11 families right before an election.”171 Senator
Corker, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
who voted in favor of the veto override to pass JASTA, said
shortly after JASTA became law that he “wish[es] we had all
focused on this a little bit more, earlier,” and expressed concern that lawmakers did not adequately scrutinize the details
ahead of time.172 Senator Lindsey Graham similarly expressed
a conflicted mentality about JASTA, saying that though he is
“for the 9/11 families having their day in court,” he also clarified he was “for not exposing our people unnecessarily” and
warned that lawmakers should “be careful what [they] wish
for.”173 Similarly, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell admitted that while everyone was aware of who stood to benefit
from JASTA, “nobody had really focused on the potential downsides in terms of our international relationships.”174
This immediate expression of remorse or regret from legislators prompted critics of Congress to label the veto override to
168
See Christopher Ingraham, Believe It or Not, Congress Gets More Done in
Election Years, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (May 1, 2014), https://www.washington
post.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/05/01/believe-it-or-not-congress-gets-moredone-in-election-years/?utm_term=.9e06b5a694e2 [https://perma.cc/U3VYBQM6].
169
See id. Overall, Congress has been passing fewer and fewer bills over time,
but in every congressional term since 1947, Congress has passed more bills
during the second year of the term than the first. Id.
170
Supra note 160.
171
Cherkaoui, supra note 1.
172
Eilperin & Demirjian, supra note 1.
173
Id. A good example of the rhetoric senators were faced with when voting for
the veto override of JASTA can be found in the New York Times. Mindy Kleinberg,
whose husband was a victim of 9/11, expressed her support for JASTA by saying
that “[i]t’s stunning to think that our government would back the Saudis over its
own citizens.” Sentiments like these that seem to pit the executive against victims
of terrorism are exactly what many senators hoped to avoid by passing JASTA.
Mazzetti, supra note 9.
174
Cherkaoui, supra note 1; Adam Brown, Senators McCain and Graham Propose Amendment to JASTA, MOROCCO WORLD NEWS (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www
.moroccoworldnews.com/2016/12/202745/senators-mccain-graham-proposeamendment-jasta/ [https://perma.cc/UK5K-GDXP].
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pass JASTA “a mistake,” “pathetic,” “embarrassing,” and “mob
legislating.”175 These critiques are indicative of Congress’s
short-term thinking, but also of its lack of expertise on the
issue. Following the passage of JASTA, President Obama
spoke at a town hall hosted by the media outlet CNN, attacking
JASTA as a congressional failure to do “what’s hard” and arguing that the true danger of JASTA was its removal of national
security and foreign policy experts from the discussion of foreign sovereign immunity.176 President Obama conceded that
he “underst[ood] why” JASTA passed—“All of us still carry the
scars and trauma of 9/11,” he explained—but he expressed
disappointment in Congress for not taking the harder route,
suggesting JASTA was more of a lay approach to foreign sovereign immunity than a fully-informed, expert approach.177
Though proponents of legislative involvement in foreign sovereign immunity may argue that this lay approach is precisely
what makes Congress the right actor to make changes to foreign sovereign immunity,178 others have expressed concern
that Congress is “playing with fire here, even if for a laudable
purpose.”179
Furthermore, the Legislature’s lack of confidence in its own
ability and expertise in foreign affairs is also manifested by the
Legislature’s constant willingness to give power back to the
Executive Branch or ratify executive decisions after action has
been taken.180 Similar to the Treasury Appropriations Act,
JASTA also contains a provision that invites the Executive
Branch to intervene, if necessary, through the State Department and Attorney General,181 which could serve as a means of
removing congressional power to modify foreign sovereign
immunity.
175
Cherkaoui, supra note 1 (first quoting Editorial, Mob Legislating by Congress, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
mob-legislating-by-congress/2016/10/01/ac557a06-8754-11e6-ac72a29979381495_story.html?utm_term=.c4297c83d902 [https://perma.cc/63SXPWVX]; then quoting Kruzel, supra note 132); Eilperin & Demirjian, supra note 1.
176
Cherkaoui, supra note 1 (quoting Seung Min Kim, Congress Disses Obama
One Last Time, POLITICO (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/
09/obama-congress-veto-override-228869 [https://perma.cc/KY2T-H744]).
177
Eilperin & Demirjian, supra note 1.
178
Chuck Schumer, one of the sponsors of JASTA, accused the Executive
Branch of being “far more interested in diplomatic considerations,” in contrast to
the legislators who are “more interested in the families and in justice,” and declared the administration “just dead wrong on this issue.” Cherkaoui, supra note
1 (quoting Kim, supra note 176).
179
Eilperin & Demirjian, supra note 1.
180
See Henkin, supra note 157, at 292.
181
JASTA § 5(b).
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Third, significant congressional interventions in foreign
sovereign immunity may not be a desirable separation of powers between the three branches of government because of the
bureaucratic limitations Congress faces. Though divided government is “baked into our constitutional structure,” it also
shares a direct relationship with gridlock and legislative inaction.182 By the time Congress passed JASTA in 2016, some
form of this legislation had been in the making for over a decade, illustrating Congress’s slow pace and difficulty in responding swiftly to even the most sympathetic appeals from
constituents.
However, now that JASTA has become law, Congress’s
ability to amend the legislation’s flaws and loopholes may become particularly salient. The day JASTA became law, Representatives Darrell Issa and Juan Vargas introduced the
Safeguarding America’s Armed Forces and Effectiveness Act
(SAAFE) as an amendment to JASTA that would limit JASTA’s
application to only those claims arising out of the 9/11 attacks.183 However, the bill has made no subsequent progress.
Similarly, on November 30, 2016, Senators John McCain and
Lindsey Graham also proposed amendments to JASTA that
would narrow its reach.184 This proposed amendment focused
on adding an intent element to JASTA’s exception, and Senator
Graham was careful to emphasize that he did not “want any
nation state, including ours, to be sued for a discretionary act
unless that discretionary act encompasses knowingly engaging
in the financing or sponsorship of terrorism whether directly or
indirectly.”185
Though the 115th Congress started its term with more
productivity than in recent years,186 distractions such as multiple healthcare votes,187 protracted nomination proceed182
Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065,
2076–77 (2013).
183
Safeguarding America’s Armed Forces and Effectiveness Act, H.R. 6223,
114th Cong. (2016).
184
See Brown, supra note 174.
185
Id.
186
Philip Bump, Trump’s First Congress Is Off to a Faster-Than-Normal Slow
Start, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
politics/wp/2017/03/21/trumps-first-congress-is-off-to-a-faster-than-normalslow-start/?utm_term=.ff1206c07178 [https://perma.cc/S8XD-6KPK].
187
Leigh Anne Caldwell, Obamacare Repeal Fails: Three GOP Senators Rebel in
49-51 Vote, NBC NEWS (Jul. 28, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/senate-gop-effort-repeal-obamacare-fails-n787311 [https://perma.cc/
QJX8-TQMM].
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ings,188 and congressional investigations189 may keep JASTA
in the background for some time. As of January 2018, the
115th Congress had enacted just ninety-seven laws, which was
the fourth fewest for the first calendar year of a congressional
session in thirty years, leaving little hope that Congress will be
able to amend JASTA in the near future.190
d. The Diminished Executive Role under JASTA
As President Obama lamented, JASTA reduces the Executive’s ability to make decisions regarding foreign sovereign immunity.191 Though the gradual reduction in the Executive’s
control over foreign sovereign immunity arguably started with
the codification of restricted foreign sovereign immunity in the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, JASTA presents
separation of powers concerns much larger than that codification. As he vetoed JASTA, President Obama declared that
JASTA “would neither protect Americans from terrorist attacks
nor improve the effectiveness of our response to such attacks”
because it marginalized the role of the Executive Branch’s experts.192 JASTA, according to President Obama, inhibits the
federal government’s ability to coordinate a “response that considers the wide range of important and effective tools
available.”193
JASTA trades the variety of tools available to the Executive
for a mechanical and poorly articulated judicial instrument,
thereby removing power from the branch best suited to address
foreign affairs concerns like international terrorism. Some
analysts may fear an Executive with ever-growing power,194
but allowing further infringement on foreign sovereign immu188
Tamara Keith, Despite Recent Additions, Trump Cabinet Still Emptier Than
Predecessors’, NPR NEWS (Feb. 9, 2017, 11:46 AM ET), http://www.npr.org/
2017/02/09/513926267/despite-recent-additions-trump-cabinet-still-emptierthan-predecessors [https://perma.cc/K6GP-C4K4].
189
Nicholas Fandos, Despite Mueller’s Push, House Republicans Declare No
Evidence of Collusion, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/03/12/us/politics/house-intelligence-trump-russia.html [https://perma
.cc/CV4G-CXCN].
190
Drew DeSilver, Despite GOP Control of Congress and White House, Lawmaking Lagged in 2017, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 11, 2018), http://www.pewresearch
.org/fact-tank/2018/01/11/despite-gop-control-of-congress-and-white-houselawmaking-lagged-in-2017/ [https://perma.cc/J3BW-6HZK].
191
See Presidential Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the
Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, 2016 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 628
(Sept. 23, 2016).
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
See Katyal, supra note 163, at 2316.
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nity is not the proper mechanism for reigning in the Executive.
The Executive is arguably best functionally suited to address
foreign sovereign immunity for alleged state sponsors of terrorism because of the flexibility the branch enjoys. Unlike the
judiciary and the Legislature, which can only act through judicial opinions, statutes, and formal acts, the President has the
power and infrastructure to act quickly, informally, discreetly,
and secretly, all of which create a more nuanced, effective, and
cautious response to issues like terrorism and foreign sovereign immunity.195 Because “only the President has the ability
to effect comprehensive, coherent change in administrative
policymaking,” legislation that removes power from the Executive Branch should be viewed with a skeptical eye for its functional impacts.196 In contrast, JASTA’s scheme of foreign
sovereign immunity allows private plaintiffs to “enlist the
courts in pursuit of a personalized foreign policy.”197
Criticism of the original terrorism exception included concerns that attachment provisions “seriously weaken” the President’s ability to control national security and that such
legislation would hinder the Executive’s ability to normalize
relations with state sponsors of terrorism.198 JASTA exacerbates these separation-of-powers problems by forcing the Executive to soothe and normalize relationships that had been
progressing smoothly under the assumption of foreign sovereign immunity. Despite having previously enjoyed amicable
and mutually beneficial relationships with Saudi Arabia and
Turkey, the U.S. federal government must now attempt to allay
fears of constant litigation in the judicial branch. Furthermore,
JASTA will also have a negative effect on other processes within
the Executive Branch. By connecting the State Department’s
list of Foreign Terror Organizations (FTOs) to an exception for
foreign sovereign immunity, JASTA complicates the Executive
Branch’s decision to designate an organization an FTO. This
shifts the Executive’s decision-making power from determining
which states are designated as a sponsor of terror to determining which organizations should be listed as FTOs. Though this
shift may appear subtle, the changes proposed by JASTA re195

See Henkin, supra note 157, at 291.
Katyal, supra note 164, at 2318 (quoting Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2341 (2001)).
197
Schwartz, supra note 159.
198
Kim, supra note 31, at 526 (quoting Victims’ Access to Terrorist Assets:
Hearing on Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (prepared statement of Stuart E.
Eizenstat, Deputy Secretary, Department of the Treasury)).
196
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present a serious burden on the Executive because they require that the State Department consider the implications for
foreign sovereign immunity when compiling its list of FTOs,
and will likely ultimately have a chilling effect on the number of
organizations designated as FTOs in an attempt to preserve
foreign sovereign immunities.199
The President’s access to a highly sophisticated and accurate intelligence mechanism allows the Executive Branch to
make the hard decisions President Obama feared that Congress shied away from when Congress passed JASTA. Though
the judiciary has fact-finding mechanisms and the ability to
compel discovery, cooperation, and testimony, and Congress
can oversee some aspects of the political process through fragmented committees, the Executive enjoys unique and unified
“real-time access to the full range of inputs necessary for integrating intelligence collection practices into a national strategy.”200 The Executive’s ability to conduct both monetary and
strategic cost-benefit analysis points in favor of affording the
Executive and its designations of which countries qualify as
state sponsors of terrorism substantial deference, rather than
legislating around this designation as JASTA does.201
3. Political Motivations and Questions
Related to the issue of removing power from the Executive
through legislation is the concern that bills and acts like JASTA
are transparently politically motivated. The State Department’s decision to designate a state as a sponsor of terror is
already an inherently political decision that undoubtedly has
important foreign relations consequences. To unmoor foreign
199
This chilling effect has important political ramifications. Designating an
organization as a Foreign Terror Organization (FTO) under § 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act requires that the group’s actions “threatens the security
of United States nationals or the national security [(national defense, foreign
relations, or economic interests)] of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)
(2012). This designation is significant because it criminalizes providing material
support to an FTO, allows for the deportation of any FTO representatives or
members, and requires U.S. financial institutions with funds associated with an
FTO to retain possession of the assets and file a report with the U.S. treasury.
Furthermore, designating a group as an FTO has important normative and international consequences because it stigmatizes the group; deters donations and
financial support; raises public awareness and knowledge about the FTO; and
signals to other governments that the United States is concerned about the FTO
and its potential negative impact on national security. See Foreign Terror Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085
.htm [https://perma.cc/S3E6-2642] (last visited May 7, 2017).
200
Samuel J. Rascoff, Presidential Intelligence, 129 HARV. L. REV. 633, 679
(2016).
201
See id. at 677.
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sovereign immunity from this designation only serves to further politicize the process of suing a foreign sovereign based on
alleged acts of terrorism. At no point has Saudi Arabia been
listed on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terror,202 likely reflecting a judgment of the Executive that such a
designation would not benefit the United States’ foreign relations.203 Furthermore, the 9/11 Commission, charged with
“prepar[ing] a full and complete account of the circumstances
surrounding the September 11 attacks,”204 found no evidence
that the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon were
sponsored, funded, or supported by the Saudi Arabian government.205 Allowing an estimated 9,000 claimants to file suits
against the Saudi Arabian government under the terrorism exception, based on facts like the attackers’ nationality, can only
serve to inject domestic politics into bilateral international
relationships.206
Furthermore, the events leading up to and following the
veto override to pass JASTA reveal the consequences of putting
foreign sovereign immunity to a vote by a legislative body. The
Saudi Arabian government paid millions of dollars to lobby
against JASTA, perhaps explaining its later threats to remove
its significant assets from American holdings.207 Following the
veto override, the Senate also voted on a measure to restrict
arms sales to Saudi Arabia in an attempt to compel the Saudi
Arabian government to stop its abuses in Yemen. Though the
measure was tabled by a 71–27 vote, these events coalesced
202

See supra note 82.
For an analysis of the Obama Doctrine, see Samuel Oakford & Peter Salisbury, Yemen: The Graveyard of the Obama Doctrine, ATLANTIC (Sept. 23, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/09/yemen-saudiarabia-obama-riyadh/501365/ [https://perma.cc/9XN2-8MWG] (“Earlier this
year, The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg published ‘The Obama Doctrine,’ in which the
president described a Middle East populated by unreliable ‘free-rider’ allies constantly drawing the United States into their petty rivalries, fueled by avarice,
tribalism, and sectarianism. Key among those free riders were the Sunni Arab
states of the Gulf, Goldberg wrote. The Saudis, along with the Iranians, Obama
said, ‘need to find an effective way to share the neighborhood.’ Yet despite the
Obama White House’s misgivings about Saudi Arabia, it backed its campaign in
Yemen, enabling perhaps the chief free-rider’s war.”). See also Farid Farid,
Obama’s Administration Sold More Weapons Than Any Other Since World War II,
VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 3, 2017, 1:31 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/
en_us/article/obamas-administration-sold-more-weapons-than-any-othersince-world-war-ii [https://perma.cc/HN99-ESRH] (describing the Obama administration’s arm sales).
204
FAIZULLAH JAN, THE MUSLIM EXTREMIST DISCOURSE: CONSTRUCTING US VERSUS
THEM 53 (2015).
205
See Mazzetti, supra note 143.
206
See id.
207
See id.
203
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into an anti-Saudi Arabian sentiment emanating from the Legislature, despite the Executive Branch’s relatively peaceful relationship with the country.208 These circumstances may also
give rise to some constitutional concerns by potentially contravening the prohibition against state bills of attainder and ex
post facto laws.209 It does, however, appear that Congress has
the constitutional power to create such legislation when it does
so with a very narrow focus.210 Whether it is politically wise or
efficient for Congress to use the full extent of its power remains
uncertain.
In the same vein, though the legislative history of JASTA
shows that the purpose of the Act is to provide victims of the 9/
11 attacks with a means to sue the Saudi Arabian Government,
there is no such limiting language present in the Act.211
Though Congress and the American people may favor allowing
suits against the Saudi Arabian government to move forward,
in the case of other countries and sovereigns, consensus may
not be so clear. Additionally, instead of categorically forbidding
suits against American allies like France, Israel, and Turkey,212
JASTA allows private litigants and courts to act as “private
secretar[ies] of state” and file any suit they choose without
regard to its effect on foreign relations.213
4. Enforcement
The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act allows for
many more suits against foreign sovereigns by expanding both
the classes of eligible claimants and defendants. However,
JASTA does not provide a proportionate expansion of enforcement mechanisms of judgments against foreign sovereigns. As
208

See Eilperin & Demirjian, supra note 1.
See David F. Forte, The Heritage Guide to the Constitution: State Bill of
Attainder and State Ex Post Facto, HERITAGE FOUND. http://www.heritage.org/
constitution/#!/articles/1/essays/71/state-bill-of-attainder-and-state-ex-postfacto [https://perma.cc/L3EU-BLJ3] (last visited July 23, 2017).
210
In Bank Markazi v. Peterson, the Supreme Court held that Congress did
not violate the constitutional separation of powers by passing the Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, which was outcome determinative and addressed a single, specific case of post-judgment attachment for a case
won under the § 1605A terrorism exception. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136
S. Ct. 1310 (2016). Despite protests from Iran’s central bank that the legislation
violated the separation of powers, the Supreme Court held that “Congress acted
comfortably within the political branches’ authority over foreign sovereign immunity and foreign-state assets.” Id. at 1329.
211
See Chossudovsky, supra note 133.
212
See id.
213
Kim, supra note 31, at 525 (alteration in original) (quoting Roger Parloff,
Deep Freezing Terror’s Assets, AM. LAW., June 2002).
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discussed above, enforcement is a significant obstacle in all
claims under the FSIA, but enforcement and collection become
a much larger issue in cases of terrorism, and all but impossible under JASTA’s new cause of action.
The difficulties of enforcing judgments brought under
§ 1605A prompted a series of legislative reforms detailed above.
Section 1610 of the U.S. Code, which discusses exceptions to
the immunity from attachment or execution, contains a number of express references to the older terrorism exception to the
FSIA. Sections 1610(a)(7), 1610(b), 1610(f), and 1610(g) all explicitly address enforcement of judgments won using
§ 1605A.214 However, JASTA made no amendments to § 1610,
therefore leaving it unclear to observers, courts, claimants, and
defendants if these extra mechanisms were meant to apply to
§ 1605B’s new cause of action. Without the added means of
enforcement that cases brought under § 1605A enjoy, it is
doubtful that JASTA cases will be enforced at a higher or even
comparable rate as previous cases for international
terrorism.215
Furthermore, because JASTA does not significantly alter
the enforcement and attachment framework to satisfy judgments against foreign sovereigns but does increase the number
of foreign states vulnerable to suit, the simpler solution for
defendants may be to never bring or keep assets within U.S.
jurisdiction. Upon passage of JASTA, the Saudi Arabian government immediately threatened to remove its assets from the
United States as a means of avoiding collection for future litigation.216 Though some analysts alleged that Saudi officials exaggerated its holdings in U.S. debt and would ultimately have
difficulty following through with these threats, this remains a
viable option as a means of avoiding enforcement in the future
if JASTA is not amended.217
CONCLUSION AND OTHER POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
In January 2018, Saudi Arabia requested that a U.S. judge
in the Southern District of New York dismiss the lawsuit pend214
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1610(a)(7), (b), (f), (g) (2012). For an argument that courts
should read § 1610(g) as creating a free-standing exception for terrorism-related
cases, see Alyssa N. Speichert, The Persepolis Complex: A Case for Making the
Collections Process Easier Under Section 1610(g) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for Victims of Foreign State-Sponsored Terrorism, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV.
547, 579–85 (2017).
215
See Wuerth, supra note 3.
216
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
217
See id.
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ing against the country for allegedly helping al-Qaeda carry out
the September 11 attacks.218 These allegations may be sufficient to move the case forward under JASTA, but, in asking for
dismissal, Saudi Arabia’s lawyer emphasized that the FBI, CIA,
and 9/11 Commission independently failed to find involvement
by Saudi Arabia in the attacks and that “conclusions, speculation, [and] hearsay are not enough” to sustain a cause of action.219 The expansions to the FSIA’s terrorism exception in
JASTA implicate serious concerns about comity and reciprocity, the separation of powers, and political questions. While
this decision is pending, it is clear that JASTA calls into question the role of foreign sovereign immunity and how it will be
managed in times of international turbulence and violence
committed by non-state actors. It remains to be seen whether
the United States will face a backlash of reciprocal litigation,
but early indications show that the passage of JASTA did not go
unnoticed in the international community.
The shortcomings of JASTA and the FSIA’s terrorism exception need not be accepted as inevitable or incurable.
Though such a large addition to the exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity may present the simplest solution for addressing human rights violations, these legislative acts are by no
means the only solution. Creating a mechanism that would
give the Legislature more oversight over the Executive’s decisions regarding the necessity of foreign sovereign immunity
would likely appeal to each branch’s institutional competency.
Allowing the Executive to act first on issues of foreign affairs is
desirable because of its access to information and flexibility.
However, this power does not need to go unchecked. The Legislature’s ability to conduct investigations, make recommendations, and draft bills that enable enforcement and to express
the needs of constituents should also not be overlooked. If the
U.S. Congress wants to provide victims of terrorism with
greater recourse in American courts, changing the enforcement
mechanisms available in terrorism-exception cases would present a much simpler and safer solution than allowing for countries like Saudi Arabia to be sued in the United States.

218

Bob Van Voris, Saudi Arabia Claims No Evidence It Aided 9/11 Plot, BLOOM(Jan. 18, 2018, 12:06 PM EST), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-18/saudi-arabia-tells-judge-there-s-no-evidence-it-aided-9-11plot [https://perma.cc/WAD5-3ZCV].
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